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ABSTRACT
Recent research advances in wireless security have shown that
advanced jamming can significantly decrease the performance of
wireless communications. In advanced jamming, the adversary
intentionally concentrates the available energy budget on specific
critical components (e.g., pilot symbols, acknowledgement packets,
etc.) to (i) increase the jamming effectiveness, as more targets can
be jammed with the same energy budget; and (ii) decrease the
likelihood of being detected, as the channel is jammed for a shorter
period of time. These key aspects make advanced jamming very
stealthy yet exceptionally effective in practical scenarios.
One of the fundamental challenges in designing defense mech-
anisms against an advanced jammer is understanding which jam-
ming strategies yields the lowest throughput, for a given channel
condition and a given amount of energy. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this problem still remains unsolved, as an analytic model to
quantitatively compare advanced jamming schemes is still miss-
ing in existing literature. To fill this gap, in this paper we conduct
a comparative analysis of several most viable advanced jamming
schemes in the widely-used MIMO networks. We first mathemati-
cally model a number of advanced jamming schemes at the signal
processing level, so that a quantitative relationship between the
jamming energy and the jamming effect is established. Based on
the model, theorems are derived on the optimal advanced jamming
scheme for an arbitrary channel condition. The theoretical findings
are validated through extensive simulations and experiments on a
5-radio 2x2 MIMO testbed. Our results show that the theorems are
able to predict jamming efficiency with high accuracy. Moreover, to
further demonstrate that the theoretical findings are applicable to
address crucial real-world jamming problems, we show that the the-
orems can be incorporated to state-of-art reinforcement-learning
based jamming algorithms and boost the action exploration phase
so that a faster convergence is achieved.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless jamming is widely recognized as one of the most crucial
topics in wireless security [35]. To understand how harmful a jam-
mer could be, researchers have studied the worst-case jamming
attack with fine-tuned temporal pattern (e.g., pulse jamming [25]),
frequency-pattern (e.g., frequency-hopping jamming [26]), and so
on. During the last few years, a new family of advanced jamming has
gained momentum [2, 7, 8, 15, 27, 28], where the target component
of the jammed transmission is the main objective to optimize.
The key intuition behind advanced jamming is that, although
some components of the wireless transmission do not carry payload
information, they nevertheless constitute the “Achilles’ heel” of
the entire communication process. For example, at the physical
(PHY) layer, pilot jamming has been proposed to disrupt orthogo-
nal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) and multiple-input
and multiple-output (MIMO), since they heavily rely on accurate
channel estimation through pilot symbols [5, 10, 15, 23]. Further-
more, at the link (MAC) layer, acknowledgement (ACK) jamming
has been proposed to disrupt medium access control operations
[3, 21, 24]. Since advanced jamming activities are restricted to a
specific period of time, an advanced jammer can degrade the net-
work throughput with a comparatively lower energy budget yet
with lower probability of being detected [7, 8].
The key limitation of existing work (discussed in details in Sec-
tion 2) is that it does not provide the analytic tools to thoroughly
investigate the quantitative relationship between the jamming energy
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and the jamming outcome. As a consequence, literature still lacks a
mathematical model to compare advanced jamming schemes, each
with a different target component, to understand which one yields the
highest jamming efficiency.We point out that a mathematical model
of advanced jamming attacks is of fundamental importance not
only from a theoretical perspective, but for a number of practical
reasons as well. First, it is straightforward to notice that jammers
usually do not want their attacks to be discovered. Therefore, to
increase stealthiness, advanced jammers need to keep the jamming
signal energy below a certain threshold and corrupt the channel
for as little time as possible. Furthermore, it is well known that
jammed nodes usually react with strategies such as rate adaptation
and rerouting [14, 29–31]. Therefore, real-world advanced jammers
necessarily face dynamic, time-varying scenarios, where adaptive
jamming strategies are almost mandatory. In these circumstances,
analytic tools on most effcient advanced jamming schemes are
extremely valuable for an advanced jammer.
As a first attempt to address the existing research gap, this article
focuses on widely-used MIMO networks, and makes the following
contributions:
(1) We select three most viable schemes in MIMO networks,
each with a different target component, and rigorously model them
at the signal-processing level, so that a mathematical relationship
between the amount of jamming energy used and the throughput
degradation is established for an arbitrary channel condition. Based
on the model, we compare the jamming schemes and derive theo-
rems on optimal jamming strategies in various scenarios. Our main
theoretical results conclude that (i) for a given data packet, the rela-
tive efficiency for barrage jamming and pilot jamming is decided by
the pilot sequence length and the number of transmitting antennae
(Theorem 1); (ii) under some conditions, pilot jamming will lead to
a lower average signal-to-inteference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of the
ACK packet than directly jamming the ACK packet itself (Theorem
2); and (iii) ACK jamming can be compared with pilot and barrage
jamming, on the basis of packet error rate (PER) lower bound, and
the result is decided by a number of factors including pilot length,
modulation and coding scheme (MCS) used for both data and ACK
packets, and the distances from the jammer to the transmitter and
receiver (Theorem 3). Our theoretical foundations are validated
through extensive simulations and experiments on MIMO testbed
made up by 5 USRP software-defined radios. Results indicate that
our model is able to capture the behavior of advanced jamming
strategies in complex MIMO scenarios accurately.
(2) To demonstrate that applicability of our theoretical results
in real-world scenarios, where the theorems’ assumptions cannot
be validated either due to missing information or dynamic environ-
ment, we propose a way to incorporate the theorems to state-of-art
reinforcement-learning [9, 18, 20] based jamming algorithms, such
as [1]. Specifically, we show that the theorems on jamming efficiency
can be used by the jammer to improve the efficiency of the action
space exploration up to a significant extent. Indeed, extensive simula-
tions show the effectiveness of our approach and show significant
improvement in both convergence speed and the total reward.
Scope and Limitations
We point out that the objective of our study is not to investigate
every possible component in a wireless network that an advanced
jammer can target. Instead, we focus on the modeling and analysis
on a typical wireless scenario (MIMO networks) and several typical
advanced jamming schemes, and show that (i) theoretical analysis
based on rigorous model can predict the worst-case jamming results
for certain scenarios; (ii) the theorems can be incorporated with
practical, reinforcement-learning based jamming algorithms, thus
extending their applicability to scenarios with limited information
or dynamic environment.
Moreover, we do not claim that our results provide jamming
strategies that are optimal on every possible aspect. As we have
pointed out earlier, there are also other aspects of jamming strat-
egy that can be optimized, such as temporal pattern and frequency
pattern of the jamming signal. We have focused on the relatively
under-explored aspect of jamming target, and provided insights on
how to optimally choose the component of the wireless transmis-
sion to jam.
2 RELATEDWORK
As far as the physical layer is concerned, Clancy [5] proposes to dis-
rupt OFDM links using pilot jamming and pilot nulling attacks. La
Pan et al. [10] consider false preamble timing and preamble nulling
attacks in OFDM. Moreover, Rahbari et al. [17] study the impact of
jamming onOFDM frequency offset (FO). Specific toMIMO systems,
Sodagari et al. [19] propose an attack where the jamming signal
transforms the estimated MIMO channel matrix into a singular ma-
trix. Pirzadeh et al. show in [15] that the MIMO spectral efficiency
can be significantly degraded by jamming both the training phase
and the data transmission phase. Wang et al. [23] propose a random
channel training (RCT)-based secure transmission framework to
address MIMO jamming.
Regarding the link layer, an advanced jammer can exploit the
temporal pattern between transmissions as well as critical control
packets. Bayrak et al. [3] consider a scenario where the jammer
exploits the exponential backoff mechanism of IEEE 802.11, and
show that the jammer can achieve higher efficiency if aware of the
current backoff states of the users. Jamming against IEEE 802.11b
is discussed by Thuente et al. in [21], based on launching CTS jam-
ming, ACK jamming, or DIFS wait jamming attacks. ACK jamming
in IEEE 802.15.4 is also considered by Wilhelm et al. in [24].
The core limitation of the above mentioned pioneering works is
the approach of investigating an individual jamming scheme for a
fixed environment. While the potential threat of various advanced
jamming schemes have been revealed, the important question of op-
timal advanced jamming strategy, when multiple jamming schemes
are available and the environment is time-varying, is still open.
The closest work to ours is [7, 8], where the authors investigate
energy-optimal jamming strategies to achieve stealthiness and in-
crease effectiveness. Specifically, DeBruhl and Tague [8] show that
energy-efficient short-form periodic jamming can seriously degrade
communication capabilities without compromising the jammer’s
activity. DeBruhl et al. [7] investigate finite-energy jamming games,
where jammers choose among different actions (i.e., sleep, power
and channel). The authors compute the games’ Nash equilibria, and
test the performance of the optimal strategies against random and
adaptive strategies. These works, however, have not focused on
jamming schemes directed at critical components of a transmission,
and therefore differ significantly from ours.
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3 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we illustrate a typical model for MIMO wireless
communication, upon which three jamming schemes are modeled.
Some commonly used notations: we use {∗}T , {∗}H and {∗}† to
denote the transpose, Hermitian, and pseudo inverse of a matrix
{∗}; ˆ{∗} and ˜{∗} represent the estimate and estimation error of {∗};
I {∗} is used to denote a {∗} × {∗} unity matrix; and E{∗} denotes
the expectation of {∗}.
Physical Layer. We consider a MIMO link with forward (i.e.,
data) and backward (i.e., ACK) transmissions as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Tx
Rx
Jam
Tx
Rx
Jam
H
G
HT
F
Tx
x
Ja
Tx
x
Ja
T
F
(a) (b)
Figure 1: MIMO link for (a) forward and (b) backward transmis-
sions under jamming. Tx: transmitter; Rx: receiver; Jam: jammer.
Without loss of generality, we assume the transmitter, receiver,
and the jammer are equipped withM , N , and L antennae, respec-
tively.1 Therefore, the channel from the transmitter to the receiver,
from the jammer to the receiver, and from the jammer to the trans-
mitter can be denoted with matrices H = {hnm }1≤n≤N ,1≤m≤M ,
G = {дnl }1≤n≤N ,1≤l ≤L , and F = { fml }1≤m≤M,1≤l ≤L . Vectors
x = {x1, . . . ,xM }T , y = {y1, . . . ,yN }T and z = {z1, . . . , zL}T are
used to represent the transmitted, received and jamming signals,
respectively. while vectorw = {w1, . . . ,wN }T represents Gaussian
noise at the receiver, with spectral density N0.
We assume that the channels are subject to path loss and Rayleigh
fading. The path loss is determined by the physical distance of the
communicating parties, and therefore remains the same for every
entry in the same channel matrix. We will use θ {∗} to denote the
path loss of the channel {∗}. Combined with the Rayleigh fading
component, it follows that
hnm ∼ CN(0,θH ), ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N ,∀1 ≤ m ≤ M, (1)
дnl ∼ CN(0,θG ), ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N ,∀1 ≤ l ≤ L, (2)
fml ∼ CN(0,θF ), ∀1 ≤ m ≤ M,∀1 ≤ l ≤ L, (3)
i.e., the entries of the channelmatrix are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables, with zero
mean and variance equal to the path loss.
MIMO can be used to achieve multiplexing or diversity gain [33].
For the data transmission on the forward link, since high through-
put is usually required, we focus on spatial multiplexing, where
different bits are transmitted on the M antennae simultaneously
1For simplicity, we will refer to the transmitter of the forward link as transmitter, even
when it is the receiver of the backward link. Similarly, the term receiver will be used
solely to address the receiver of the forward link.
(we will refer to them asM spatial “channels”). Following [16], the
baseband model for this scheme is
y =
{
Hx +w, not jammed,
Hx +Gz +w, jammed. (4)
Let Es and Ej denote the average symbol energy for the trans-
mitted and jamming signals. Then, it follows that
E{xxH } = Es IM , (5)
E{zzH } = Ej IL . (6)
For the ACK transmission on the backward link, since high reli-
ability is often required, we focus on MIMO schemes that achieve
diversity instead of spatial multiplexing. To this end, we consider a
scheme where diversity is achieved via beamforming and Maximal
Ratio Combining (also called as MIMO-MRC). Specifically, the re-
ceiver leverages the channel information acquired in the previous
forward transmission, and beamforms using a vector u satisfying
(HˆT )H HˆT u = λmaxu, (7)
i.e., the eigenvector corresponding to themaximal eigenvalue (λmax)
of the matrix (HˆT )H HˆT . A symbol x is precoded by u, and the
resultant ux is transmitted over the antennae. Therefore, we have
the baseband model
y = HT ux + Fz +w. (8)
Without loss of generality, we assume that ∥u∥2 = N , so that
the total transmitting energy across the N antennae is NEs , for
E{x2} = Es .
Link Layer. Received data packets are acknowledged by the
receiver on link layer. To establish a relationship between physical
layer metrics and the PER, we borrow the model in [12]. Specifically,
suppose a MCS z is chosen from a setZ, the PER e , as a function
of SINR γ , can be approximated as
e(γ |z) =
{
1, γ ≤ γth,
aze
−bzγ , γ > γth,
(9)
with MCS-dependent parameters az and bz . The threshold γth also
varies with different MCSs.
3.1 Advanced Jamming Schemes
The objective of the jammer is to efficiently degrade the throughput
of the jammed link. To this end, the jammer may (i) directly inject
interference to the entire data packet and lower the achievable
SINR (we will refer to this scheme as barrage jamming, following
[5]); (ii) jam the pilot symbols to invalidate the estimated channel,
also called pilot jamming [32]; or (iii) prevent ACKs from being
delivered, also called ACK jamming [11]. We will formally model
each of these cases, and analyze the resulting effects.
Barrage Jamming. In this case, the jammer emits Gaussian
noise uniformly on the entire data packet, lowering the resulting
receiver SINR and consequently degrading the throughput of the
jammed link. The baseband model in presence of jamming is shown
in (4). We assume that when the jamming energy is uniformly
allocated upon the entire data packet, the channel estimation error is
negligible, i.e., Hˆ ≈ H . Therefore, the transmitted signal is recovered
as follows:
xˆ = Hˆ†y ≈ x + H†Gz + H†w, (10)
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where H† = (HHH )−1HH is the left pseudo inverse of H .
The SINR per symbol on them-th spatial channel is then
γm =
Es
Ej [H †GGH (H †)H ]mm + N0[(HHH )−1]mm
. (11)
Pilot Jamming. The advanced jammermay also aim at jamming
the pilot symbols, resulting in channel estimation errors and further
impairing data decoding. The pilot signal comprises of a sequence of
symbols agreed on by the transmitter and receiver, denoted as X =
{x1, . . . , xK }, assuming a sequence of length K is used. Similarly,
the received sequence, jamming sequence, and the noise sequence
are Y = {y1, . . . , yK }, Z = {z1, . . . , zK }, andW = {w1, . . . ,wK },
respectively. Thus, for the pilot, we have
Y = HX +GZ +W . (12)
Least square estimation gives the estimated channel matrix
Hˆ = H +GZX † +WX †, (13)
with X † = XH (XXH )−1 as the right pseudo inverse of X . The
estimation in (13) introduces an error term
H˜ = (GZ +W )X †, (14)
which will affect the recovery of the received signal.
According to [4] and [13], to achieve optimal estimation, the
pilot must satisfy
XXH = KEs IM . (15)
With this condition, the statistical characteristic of the channel
estimation error is given by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The channel estimation error H˜ satisfies E{H˜ } = 0N×M
and
E{H˜AH˜H } = 1
KEs
tr(A)(EjGGH + N0IN ), (16)
for an arbitraryM ×M matrix A.
Proof. SinceE{H˜ } = 0N×M is obvious, wewill focus onE{H˜AH˜ }.
With the optimal training sequence XXH = KEs IM , we have
E{H˜AH˜H } =E{(GZ +W )X †A(X †)H (GZ +W )H }
=
1
K2E2s
E{(GZ +W )XHAX (GZ +W )H }
=
1
K2E2s
(
E{GZXHAXZHGH }
+E{WXHAXW H }
)
=
1
K2E2s
(
DBDH +WBW H
)
,
(17)
where we denote D = GZ , and B = XHAX .
For the interference D, we have
D = GZ
=

д11 · · · д1L
...
. . .
...
дN 1 · · · дNL
 ·

z11 . . . z1K
...
. . .
...
zL1 . . . zLK

=

∑
l д1lzl1 . . .
∑
l д1lzlK
...
. . .
...∑
l дNlzl1 . . .
∑
l дNlzlK

≜ (d1, . . . , dK ) .
(18)
Column k of Z represents the jamming signal at time instant k .
Therefore, they aremutually independent. Consequently, the columns
of D are also uncorrelated, and
E{dkdHk ′} =
{
EjGG
H , k = k ′,
0N×N , k , k ′.
(19)
Therefore,
E{DBDH } =E
(d1, . . . , dK ) ·

b11 . . . b1K
...
. . .
...
bK1 . . . bKK
 ·
©­­­«
dH1
...
dHK
ª®®®¬

=E
{∑
k
bkkdkd
H
k
}
= Ej tr(B)GGH .
(20)
Since B = XHAX , we have tr(B) = tr(XHAX ) = tr(XXHA) =
KEs tr(A) and E{DBDH } = EjKEs tr(A)GGH .
For the termWBW H , since all the entries ofW are i.i.d, we have
E{WBW H } = N0tr(B) = N0KEs tr(A)IN . (21)
Therefore,
E{H˜AH˜H } = 1
KEs
tr(A)
(
EjGG
H + N0IN
)
. (22)
□
The subsequent data transmission is not affected by jamming,
and complies with (4). Therefore, the decoded signal is
xˆ = Hˆ†y ≈ x + H†w − H†H˜x − H†H˜H†w. (23)
The post-processing noise is then
wˆ = H†w − H†H˜x − H†H˜H†w, (24)
with an autocorrelation given by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The Autocorrelation of the post-processing noise (24) is
E{wˆwˆH } ≈
(
1 + 1
K
)
N0(HHH )−1 + Ej MK H
†GGH (H †)H . (25)
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Proof. The autocorrelation can be derived as follows:
E{wˆwˆH } =E{(H†w − H†H˜x − H†H˜H†w)
· (H†w − H†H˜x − H†H˜H†w)H }
= E{H†wwH (H†)H + H†H˜xxH H˜H (H†)H
+ H†H˜H†wwH (H†)H H˜H (H†)H }
= N0(HHH )−1 + M
K
H†
(
EjGG
H + N0IN
)
(H†)H
+
N0
KEs
tr((HHH )−1)H†(EjGGH + N0IN )(H†)H
(26)
According to [22], tr((HHH )−1) is a small value typically no
larger than M . Since we are focusing on high SNR (by SNR we
mean signal to noise ratio, the SIR or SJR is not necessarily high)
scenario, this implies that N0/Es tr((HHH )−1) << M . In other words,
the last term is much smaller than the second term and can be
neglected. Therefore, we have
E{wˆwˆH } ≈
(
1 + 1
K
)
N0(HHH )−1 + M
K
EjH
†GGH (H†)H . (27)
□
Therefore, the “effective” SINR on them-th spatial channel is
γm =
Es
Ej MK [H †GGH (H †)H ]mm +
(
1 + 1K
)
N0[(HHH )−1]mm
, (28)
ACK Jamming.With the basebandmodel for ACK transmission
in (8), the signal can be recovered by multiplying uH (HˆT )H with
the received signal and normalizing. Therefore, at the transmitter
side, we have
xˆ =
uH (HˆT )H (HT ux + Fz +w)
uH (HˆT )H HˆT u
= x − u(Hˆ
T )H H˜T ux − u(HˆT )H (Fz +w)
uH (HˆT )H HˆT u ,
(29)
and the post-processing SINR is as shown in (30), with Ej,p and
Ej,a denoting the jamming energy per symbol in pilot jamming
and ACK jamming.
γACK = ∥uH (HˆT )H HˆT u∥2Es/{
[
Ej,p
L
tr(GHG) + NN0
]
·uH (HˆT )H HˆT u + uH (HˆT )H (Ej,aFFH + N0IM )HˆT u}
(30)
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL
JAMMING TARGET
In this section, wewill quantitatively compare the jamming schemes
modeled in Section 3 for the optimal target in the sense of jamming
efficiency. Since different targets (i.e., data packet, pilot, and ACK
packet) differ in terms of their lengths, it is unfair to directly com-
pare the jamming power. Instead, we compare the jamming effects
caused by a unit of jamming energy spent on each specific target,
regardless of their lengths (e.g., we compare the effect of spending
one unit of energy on pilot jamming vs ACK jamming).
4.1 Physical Layer Jamming
At the physical layer, the objective of degrading throughput is
equivalent to reducing the achievable SINR, for which the following
theorem holds.
Theorem 1. For a unit of jamming energy, pilot jamming yields a
lower SINR than barrage jamming if
K <
√
D ·M, (31)
where D and K are the lengths of the data packet and pilot in symbols,
andM is the number of antennae at the transmitter.
Proof. For a unit of jamming energy, the values of jamming
energy per symbol can be expressed as Ej = 1/(L · K) and Ej =
1/(L · D), with L as the number of antennae at the jammer, for
pilot jamming and barrage jamming, respectively. Plugging these
into the SINR expressions in (11) and (28), the theorem follows
immediately. □
Remark 1. According to Theorem 1, for a given data packet and
the number of transmitting antennae, the optimal choice between
barrage jamming and pilot jamming is decided solely by the pilot
sequence length. This matches intuition, since longer pilot sequences
are more robust to jamming. As long as the pilot length K ≥ √DM ,
there is no incentive for the jammer to launch a pilot jamming attack,
and the optimal jamming strategy is reduced to barrage jamming.
Note, here we are comparing on the basis that every data packet
has a pilot. In reality, a pilot is supposed to cover a channel coherence
period, during which there might be multiple data packets transmitted.
In this case, the data packets can be treated as one single payload, in
the sense of pilot jamming, since they share the same pilot.
Remark 2. The square-root form of data packet length D in (31)
may look anti-intuitive. A better interpretation is available if we
rewrite (31) to the equivalent form of
M
K
· 1
K
>
1
D
.
Note, with a unit jamming energy, 1K and
1
D are the per-symbol jam-
ming energy for pilot and barrage jamming, respectively. So Theorem
1 essentially means that, the interference caused on the pilot signal
is equivalently scaled by MK during the signal recovering phase for
the following data packet. (For a in-depth understanding of this scale,
please refer to the proofs of Lemma 1 and 2.)
This scaling reflects the way how pilot jamming works. The jam-
ming signal added to the pilot introduces errors to the estimated
channel matrix, which are “transformed” during the signal processing
in signal recovering phase. As a result, for the recovered signal, the in-
terference is equivalently scaled by MK . Interestingly, the scaling effect
is proportional to the number of transmitting antennae, and inversely
proportional to the pilot length. Therefore, while increasing number
of transmitting antennae increases the total throughput, it does not
alleviate pilot jamming. On the contrary, it makes the situation worse.
4.2 Link Layer Jamming
At the link layer, the jammer aims at disrupting the transmission
of ACK packets. Since a corrupted ACK leads to retransmission of
the corresponding data packet, it is equivalent to a corrupted data
packet in terms of the effective link throughput. To evaluate the
jamming effect, we need to compare the PER for the data and ACK
packets. However, substituting the complex forms of instantaneous
SINR of (11), (28) and (30) into the PER-SINR function (9) produces
intractable equations. To ease the analysis, we apply the expected
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SINR in (9) instead, which produces a lower bound for the PER, as
shown below.
With Rayleigh fading model, the entries of channel matrices H ,
G, and F are i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables, as shown
in Eq. (1), (2), and (3). The expected SINRs for the three jamming
schemes in Eq. (11), (28), and (30) are then derived as
γ¯b =
Es · θH
Ej,a · θG + N0 , (32)
γ¯p =
Es · θH
M
K · Ej,p · θG + (1 + 1K ) · N0
, (33)
γ¯a =
E{λmax} · N · Es · θH
N 2
K (Ej,p · θG + N0) + (L · Ej,a · θF + N0)
, (34)
where we use subscripts b, p, and a in Ej, {∗} to distinguish the
per-symbol jamming energy for barrage jamming, pilot jamming,
and ACK jamming, respectively. With the PER model in (9), we
approximate the PER as
e ≈ 1 − P{γ ≥ γth} ≥ 1 −
γ¯
γth
, (35)
where the inequality comes from Markov’s inequality. Apparently,
(35) establishes a PER lower bound
elwr = 1 −
γ¯
γth
. (36)
Theorem 2. When used exclusively, pilot jamming yields a higher
PER lower bound for the following ACK packet than ACK jamming,
with a unit jamming energy, if the following holds:
A · θG
K · θF ≥
K · L
N 2
(37)
whereA andK are lengths of the ACK packet and the pilot in symbols;
θG and θF denote the path loss from the jammer to the receiver and
transmitter; L and N are the number of antennae at the jammer and
the receiver, respectively.
Proof. Since we are comparing the PER lower bound of the
same packet (ACK), the term γth in (36) holds the same for both
jamming schemes. Therefore, we only need to compare the expected
SINR in (34).
For a unit of jamming energy, the jamming energy per symbol
is 1/(L · K) and 1/(L · A), for pilot jamming and ACK jamming,
respectively. Plugging these into the first and second terms in the
denominator of Eq. (34) and ignore the noise, it follows that, when
(37) holds:
N 2
K
· Ej,p · θG > L · Ej,a · θF ,
i.e., when used exclusively, pilot jamming yields a higher denom-
inator than ACK jamming. A lower (34) follows. Hence a higher
(36). □
Remark 3. Theorem 2 states that when the condition holds, pilot
jamming alone will lead to a higher PER lower bound of the ACK
packet than directly jamming the ACK packet itself. This is caused
by incorrect CSI being propagated directly to the ACK transmission.
Note the primary target of pilot jamming is the data packet. How-
ever, as long as the conditions in Theorem 2 holds, the optimal jamming
scheme to disrupt the following ACK packet is also pilot jamming (on
the prior data packet). Therefore, under this condition, ACK jamming
cannot be the optimal jamming scheme, and no jamming energy
should be spent on it. Partly based on this theorem, the following
theorems will give the optimal jamming schemes.
Theorem 3. Let us assume that noise is negligible. With a unit
of jamming energy, ACK jamming yields a higher PER lower bound
than barrage jamming if
A · θG
D · θF <
L · γth,a
E{λmax} · N · γth,d
; (38)
and higher lower bound than pilot jamming if
A · θG
K · θF <
K · L · γth,a
E{λmax} ·M · N · γth,d
, (39)
where A, D, and K are the lengths of the ACK packet, data packet,
and pilot, respectively;M , N , and L are the numbers of antennae at
the transmitter, receiver, and jammer, respectively; θF and θG are the
path loss from the jammer to the transmitter and receiver; γth,d and
γth,a are the SINR thresholds for data and ACK packets. λmax is the
maximum eigenvalue of (HˆT )H · HˆT .
Proof. With a unit of jamming energy, the jamming energy per
symbol is Ej,b = 1/(LD), Ej,p = 1/(LK), and Ej,a = 1/(LA), with
L as the number of antennae at the jammer, for barrage jamming,
pilot jamming, and ACK jamming, respectively. Omitting the noise
components and plugging them in (32), (33) and (34), and applying
them to (36), the theorem follows. □
Remark 4. Although (39) is sufficient to guarantee a higher PER
lower bound of the ACK packet (as a result of ACK jamming) than
that of the data packet (as a result of pilot jamming), it does not
guarantee that ACK jamming is the best choice. Recall Theorem 2 and
Remark 3, pilot jamming also affects the PER of the following ACK
packets, and sometimes yields a higher PER lower bound (on the ACK
packet) than ACK jamming per unit jamming energy. Therefore, only
when conditions in (37) and (39) both hold, is ACK jamming a better
choice than pilot jamming.
Remark 5. The major factors affecting (38) and (39) include the
SINR thresholds θth for the MCSs, the component lengths K , D and A,
and the path loss θ {∗} for G and F . This means the optimal jamming
target varies with the MCSs used by the data and ACK packets, the
pilot, payload, and ACK lengths, as well as the distance from the
jammer to the transmitter/receiver. In a scenario where any of these
factors are dynamic (e.g., in IEEE 802.11 with rate adaptation), optimal
jamming strategy needs to be dynamic, too.
5 APPLICATION TO PRACTICAL SCENARIOS
The theorems presented in the previous section reveals that the
optimal jamming target is decided by a set of variables. Obviously,
if perfect information about these variables is available, the jammer
can at all times optimize its strategy to maximize the impairment
generated to the legitimate communication process. However, in
practical scenarios, information describing these variables (e.g., pilot
length, path loss, etc.) may be unknown or dynamic. Therefore, it
remains unclear whether the theoretical results are applicable to
practical scenarios. To answer this question, we resort to machine
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Figure 2: The advanced jamming problem as an MDP.
learning and show that the theorems can be incorporated to and
enhance learning-based algorithms.
In the following, we will first introduce a variant of state-of-art
reinforcement-learning based jamming algorithm; then, we design
a novel method to improve the algorithm by using the theorems
to boost the action exploration. In this way, we provide a way to
apply the theoretical results to practical scenarios with unknown
and dynamic environment.
5.1 Reinforcement-Learning Based Jamming
Reinforcement learning [20] allows the learning agent to adapt to
the optimal action to maximize the reward in a certain environment
through trial-and-error. It has drawn attentions from researchers
and jamming algorithms based on it have been proposed in [1, 34].
We will derive a similar reinforcement learning algorithm for a
dynamic and interactive scenario described below.
Without loss of generality, we consider that before each trans-
mission, the transmitter may choose (i) a MCS; and (ii) a route. The
choice of MCS is guided by a rate adaption scheme that adjusts
the MCS according to the achieved PER. The transmitter may also
choose among a set of possible receivers for the next hop, depend-
ing on the link quality to each of them. As a result, the jammer
faces a dynamic unknown environment where information such as
MCS and path loss changes interactively with its own actions.
The scenario can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), as shown in Fig. 2 . Formally, it can be defined as a 5-tuple
{S,A,P(s, s ′),R(s,a), β}, where S and A represent the state set
and action set, P(s, s ′) is the transition probability from state s to
s ′, R(s,a) is the reward obtained by the decision agent for taking
action a at state s , and β is a discount factor.
In our model, the state set is the Cartesian product of the MCS set
and route set. To capture the different jamming schemes discussed
in Sections 3, we set the action space to a tuple a = {Jb , Jp , Ja ,Tp },
where Jb , Jp , and Ja denote the energy spent on barrage jamming,
pilot jamming, and ACK jamming, respectively. We denote by Tp
the length of the pilot jamming signal, since the real length of the
pilot K is not directly observable.
The objective of the jammer is to reduce the wireless node’s
throughput with maximum energy efficiency. Therefore, the re-
ward should increase with the throughput degradation and de-
crease with the energy consumption. For simplicity, we use the
degraded throughput subtracted by a “price” paid for the energy
spent for the degradation as the reward. Specifically, R(s,a) =
ne (a) − p(Jb + Jp + Ja ), where ne (a) is the number of data packets
lost as a result of the jamming action a and p is the price for a
unit of energy. The objective of the jammer is to identify a policy
π : s → a,∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ A, that maximizes the discounted sum
of the instant and future rewards. We solve this Markov decision
process (MDP) problem using the well-known Q-learning algorithm
[20], in which the optimum policy is found by iteratively updating
the value function for each combination of state and action. We
will omit the detailed learning algorithm here for space limit, and
focus on the novel action exploration scheme.
5.2 Theorem-Enhanced Action Exploration
Reinforcement learning algorithms are guaranteed to converge, as
long as certain conditions are met, but the convergence speed
heavily depends on the action exploration method [20]. In-
deed, at each iteration, the learning engine may choose either to
(i) explore the under-explored actions, or (ii) exploit the actions
already known to yield a good reward. Thus, an effective explo-
ration method may improve the convergence of the learning pro-
cess significantly [6]. Since the theorems derived in Section 4
establish that certain actions are more favorable than oth-
ers in certain states, we use them to improve the learning
exploration phase.
According to Theorem 1, the jammer should limit the action
space to pilot jamming withTp ≤
√
Dmax ·M and barrage jamming.
Moreover, Theorem 1 also provides a criterion to choose between
pilot jamming and barrage jamming. Suppose the jammer has an
estimate on both the data packet length D and pilot length K , in the
form of probability distribution P{K = k}. Then, it can compute
the probability that pilot jamming is more efficient than barrage
jamming, as
Pb =
∑
d ∈D,k ∈K
P{D = d} · P{k >
√
dM}. (40)
Consequently, the jammer should choose barrage jamming with
probability Pb , and pilot jamming with Tp = k with probability
Pp = (1 − Pb ) · P{K = k}. (41)
At the link layer, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 specify conditions
for the jammer to use ACK jamming, and can be used to prune un-
favorable pilot jamming or barrage jamming actions. To be specific,
when
A · θG
K · θF < min
(
K · L
N 2
,
K · Lγth,a
E{λmax} ·M · N · γth,d
)
(42)
holds, ACK jamming is more favorable than pilot jamming; and
when Eq. (38) holds, ACK jamming is more favorable than barrage
jamming. Since Theorem 2 and 3 are valid for lower bounds on the
PER, we let the jammer explore ACK jamming when the conditions
hold with probability ϵ . Variables θG , θF can be estimated by aver-
aging the signal strength received from the transmitter and receiver,
given the knowledge of transmitting power. E{λmax}, γth,a , and
γth,d can be computed offline. To summarize, the procedure for
enhanced exploration is described as a decision tree in Fig. 3, and
reported in detail in Algorithm 1.
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Figure 3: Decision tree for action selection.
Algorithm 1 Enhanced Exploration Algorithm
Initialize P{K = k }, k < √DmaxM ;
for each iteration of Q-Learning Algorithm do
Choose barrage jamming with probability (40), and Tp = k-length
pilot jamming with probability (41);
if barrage jamming is chosen and (38) holds then
Choose ACK jamming with probability ϵ ;
end if
if Tp = k-length pilot jamming is chosen and (42) holds then
Choose ACK jamming with probability ϵ ;
end if
Choose jamming energy and set the action;
Update P{K = k } if pilot jamming is chosen, according to the jamming
result;
end for
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We first validate our theorems in Section 6.1, followed by a testbed
evaluation in Section 6.2 and by an evaluation of the learning-based
jamming algorithm in Section 6.3.
6.1 Theoretical Validation
To validate the theorems in Section 4, we simulate advanced jam-
ming schemes on a MIMO link. We consider a scenario where the
transmitter, receiver, and the jammer all equipped with 2 anten-
nae. The data packet size is set to 1024 bits, and 240 packets are
aggregated to one frame, i.e., with one pilot. The pilot length may
be 4, 16, 128, or 512 symbols long. ACK packets are assumed to be
512 bits long. The data packets can be modulated with BPSK, QPSK,
16QAM, or 64QAM, while ACK packets are modulated with BPSK.
We evaluate barrage jamming, pilot jamming, and ACK jamming
with normalized jamming energy between 0 and 20, where the
energy is normalized by the energy per transmitted symbol. Note,
for barrage jamming on BPSK-modulated signals, a jamming energy
of 20 is equivalent to a signal-to-jamming ratio (SJR) of 37.9 dB.
In other words, we focus on an energy range that is negligible for
traditional barrage jamming.
Due to space limit, we only show the results for BPSK-modulated
data packets in Fig. 5. We use bit error rate (BER) as the metric, since
it is easy to measure, and is directly decided by SINR, the metric
used in both Theorem 1 and 2. Fig. 5 shows that with small pilot
length, pilot jamming significantly outperforms barrage jamming.
We also notice that the performance gain decreases with increasing
pilot length – with pilot length of 512 symbols, pilot jamming
becomes similar to barrage jamming on performance. This matches
the result predicted by Theorem 1, which states that pilot jamming
is more energy-efficient than barrage jamming when K <
√
DM –
in this case, the theoretical crossover point is approximately 495.
The effect of pilot jamming on the following ACK packet can also
be verified in Fig. 5. For K = 4, pilot jamming results in higher BER
than ACK jamming with the same energy. However, the advantage
becomes negligible forK = 16 and ACK jamming becomes better for
K = 128. This observation validates Theorem 2, which states that
pilot jamming is better than ACK jamming if K <
√
AθGN 2/(LθF )
– the point in this case is 32.
Fig. 5 does not precisely match Theorem 3, but we argue that the
lower bound of PER is not always reflected well by BER. Actually,
with larger jamming energy (not shown due to space limit), the
results in BER matches Theorem 3 much better, suggesting that
Theorem 3 is more accurate with high jamming energy.
6.2 Experimental Testbed Evaluation
We have implemented a 2 × 2 MIMO system described in Section
3 using 4 USRP N210s and 1 USRP X310. For the forward (data)
transmission, we use the I/Q data from the USRPs to evaluate dif-
ferent jamming schemes. To better control the jamming energy, we
manually add barrage and pilot jamming signals to the received
samples. The signal processing is run inMatlab, with BER computed
as the metric. Due to the limitation on computation speed, we are
unable to perform the backward (ACK) transmission in real-time,
immediately after a data packet is received. We emulate the ACK
transmission and ACK jamming by leveraging channel information
estimated from the received samples to perform beamforming, and
compute the received ACK signal with jamming signal added. The
BER is computed after signal processing of the ACK packet.
Figure 4: MIMO Experimental Testbed.
For the sake of simplicity, we use QPSK modulation for both data
and ACK transmission. Data packets are long 1024 symbols, while
the pilot length are long 64, 128, and 512 symbols – we choose long
pilots because they are also used for synchronization. The length of
ACK is set to 128 symbols. We explore 20 levels of jamming energy,
such that the interference level at the receiver side is significant
enough to create bit errors. Specifically, the jamming energy is set
to [0.5 : 0.5 : 10] × 4096, normalized by the pre-amplified symbol
energy for the data transmission.
Fig. 6 confirm simulations results. Indeed, for data packets, pilot
jamming prevails with short pilots, but becomes less efficient than
barrage jamming when the pilot length is increased to a certain
level. Although the results do not match precisely Theorem 1 on
the crossover point, we point out that Theorem 1 is derived based
on the assumption of negligible channel estimation errors, which
does not hold in the testbed experiments. Furthermore, the relation
between pilot jamming efficiency and pilot length is still valid. For
ACK jamming, we observe that ACK jamming effectively destructs
ACK transmission, achieving a BER around 0.5.
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Figure 5: BER for different jamming schemes with pilot length K = (a) 4; (b) 16; (c) 128; (d) 512. Modulation: BPSK
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Figure 6: BER as function of jamming energy (normalized to pre-amplified symbol energy) for pilot length (a) 64; (b) 128; and (c) 512.
6.3 Evaluation of Learning Algorithm
In our experiments, we assume there are two routes available to the
transmitter, while the set of MCSs includes BPSK-1/2, QPSK-9/16,
16QAM-3/4, and 64QAM-3/4 – we will refer to them as MCS 1 to
4. All the MCSs comply to the PER-SINR function in (9), with the
parameters az and bz borrowed from [12]. The state set is then
composed of 8 states, indexed as in Table 1.
State Index Description
1 - 4 Route 1, with MCS 1 - 4
5 - 8 Route 2, with MCS 1 - 4
Action Index Description
1 - 20 Barrage, energy 1 - 20
21 - 40 Pilot, energy 1 - 20, length 4
41 - 60 Pilot, energy 1 - 20, length 16
61 - 80 Pilot, energy 1 - 20, length 128
81 - 100 Pilot, energy 1 - 20, length 512
101 - 120 ACK, energy 1 - 20
Table 1: State and action sets.
The jamming normalized energy is set from 10 to 200 with a step
of 10. The jammer needs to decide the pilot jamming lengthTp , since
the jammer is not aware of the real value, which is fixed to 128 in
the simulation. We discretize the pilot jamming length to values of
4 levels, 4, 16, 128, and 512. We simulate transmission with dynamic
MCS and route adaptation (i.e., the transmitter adjusts its MCS and
route according to the link throughput). To better illustrate the
algorithm convergence in different states, we intentionally let the
transmitter perform state transition every 1000 steps.
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Figure 7: Learning-based jamming: (a) state transition; (b) best
action, enhanced exploration; (c) best action, semi-uniform explo-
ration; (d) accumulated reward.
The resultant state transition is shown in Fig. 7 (a), and the best
action at each step is shown in Fig. 7 (b). We can observe that the
transmitter starts with route 1 and the highest MCS of 64QAM-3/4.
Since receiver 1 is close to the jammer and the pilot length K = 128
satisfies (31), the best action is pilot jamming with length 128. This
is confirmed by looking at the best action in the initial steps in
Fig. 7 (b). After step 1000, the transmitter switches to route 2, and
since receiver 2 is far away while the transmitter is close to the
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jammer, the best action becomes ACK jamming, agreeing with the
results shown in Fig. 7 (b). The success of the jammer in degrading
throughput is proven by the state adaptation process, which shows
that the transmitter adapts a more reliable MCS in each update,
until the most reliable one, i.e., BPSK-1/2 is used. The jammer’s best
action remains ACK jamming since ACK packets are not affected by
theMCS adaption. To show the benefits of the enhanced exploration
method discussed in Section 5, we run simulations with the same
settings and semi-uniform exploration. State adaptation is the same
as in Fig. 7 (a), but the convergence is slower. Fig. 7 (c) concludes
that the fluctuation in best action is clearly larger than that for
enhanced exploration before step 2000. The benefit of enhanced
exploration is clearer in Fig. 7 (d), where the accumulated reward
is shown for both exploration methods.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have identified a set of potential targets for ad-
vanced jamming. Then, we have formallymodeled jamming schemes
aimed at each of these vulnerabilities, and conducted a rigorous
analysis resulting in insightful theorems that unveil optimal jam-
ming strategies in scenarios of interest. Them, we have designed a
reinforcement learning based algorithm that allows the jammer to
adapt its jamming strategy to dynamic environments. The theorems
were used to enhance the efficiency of action exploration in the
learning process. We have verified the theorems and proved the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm through extensive simula-
tions and experiments.
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